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NOTE 
SUITUM v. TAHOE REGIONAL 
PLANNING AGENCY: APPLYING 
THE TAKINGS RIPENESS RULE 




In Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, l the Ninth 
Circuit held that a regulatory takings claim under the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments was not ripe in the absence of the 
landowner's application for a final decision and the failure to 
demonstrate that such an application would be futile.2 The 
court identified the necessary application as a request to the 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency ("TRPA") to transfer the Sui-
tum property's development rights to another property.3 The 
1. 80 F.3d 359 (9th Cir. 1996) (·Suitum In (per Panner, O.M., Senior United 
States District Judge for the District of Oregon sitting by designation, Schroeder, M., 
and Alarcon, A., Circuit Judges) rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1659 (1997) (·Suitum lV"). 
2. See Suitum II, 80 F.3d at 364. The Ninth Circuit evaluated the limited futility 
exception to the ripeness doctrine. See id. at 363. Under this doctrine, the final deci-
sion requirement is excused if the plaintiff shows that fulfillment of the requirement 
would be an idle and futile act or that the application procedures are unfair. See id. 
(citing Del Monte Dunes, Ltd. v. Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496, 1501 (9th Cir. 1990); Kinzli 
v. Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d 1449, 1454-55 (9th Cir. 1987». 
3. See Suitum 11,80 F.3d at 364. The TRPA was created in 1969 by the Tahoe 
Regional Planning Compact. Pub. L. No. 91-148, 83 Stat. 360 (1969), amended by Pub. 
L. No. 96-551; 94 Stat. 3233 (1980); CAL. GoV'T CODE § 66801 (West 1969), amended by 
CAL. GoV'T CODE § 66801 (1980); NEV. REv. STAT. § 277.200 (1969), amended by 
NEV. REv. STAT. § 277.200 (1980). In 1968, California and Nevada entered into 
an interstate agreement designed to ensure resource conservation and development 
87 
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Ninth Circuit stated that until the property owner requested a 
transfer of development rights ("TDRs"), it would not be possi-
ble to determine the nature and extent of permitted develop-
ment.' As a result, the case was not ripe because the court 
could not know the full economic impact of TRPA's regulations 
on the Suitum property or whether those regulations had gone 
"too far."s 
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed 
the Ninth Circuit and held that the claim was ripe for adjudi-
cation.6 The Supreme Court found that Suitum satisfied the 
"final decision" ripeness test because no more discretionary 
TRPA decisions remained.' The Court held that the awarding 
of the TDRs was an administrative function and the valuation 
of the TDRs was an issue of fact that the trial court could have 
determined from the evidence presented.s The Supreme 
Court's decision was logical given that the record contained 
ample evidence to determine the value of the TDRs as either a 
control in the Lake Tahoe Basin. See California v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 766 
F.2d 1308, 1310 (9th Cir. 1985), amended by 775 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1985). The agree-
ment, known as the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, became effective when it re-
ceived the consent of Congress in December 1969. Pub. L. No. 91-148, 83 Stat. 360 
(1969). In 1980, California and Nevada extensively amended the Compact with the 
subsequent approval of Congress. Pub. L. No. 96-551, 94 Stat. 3233 (1980). One of the 
most significant changes in the 1980 Compact is the requirement that TRPA develop 
and establish environmental threshold carrying capacities for the Lake Tahoe Basin 
and amend the regional plan to achieve and maintain these thresholds. See Tahoe 
Reg'l Planning Agency, 766 F.2d at 1310. TRPA incorporated a land capability classifi-
cation system into the plan that identified sensitive stream environment zones (SEZs) 
where development would be curtailed. See Suitum 11, 80 F.3d at 361; Tahoe Sierra 
Preservation Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 638 F. Supp. 126, 132 (D. Nev. 
1986). The 1987 Plan adopted by the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency allows for 
transfer of a property's land coverage development rights to another parcel within the 
same hydrologic zone. See Suitum 11, 80 F.3d at 361. Residential development rights 
may be transferred anywhere within the Lake Tahoe Basin. See id. This allows an 
undeveloped property within an environmentally sensitive area, where the 1987 Plan 
restricts new development, to transfer and sell development rights to other properties 
outside restricted development areas. See id. 
4. See Suitum 11, 80 F.3d at 362. 
5. See id. (quoting Kinzli, 818 F.2d at 1453). 
6. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659 (1997) ("Suitum 
1V"). . 
7. See id. at 1667, 1670. 
8. See id. at 1668. 
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development right of the property or a compensation mecha-
nism.9 
The Supreme Court's narrow holding, however, did not ad-
dress the issue of adequate "state procedures" for compensa-
tion, which is normally the second hurdle of the ripeness test.lO 
Instead, the Court found this test inapplicable.ll As such, a 
thorough interpretation and application of the two hurdle, 
regulatory takings ripeness test was not achieved.12 In addi-
tion, the majority opinion did not address the question of 
whether TDRs should be considered a property use, to assess 
whether a taking has occurred, or as compensation, to deter-
mine whether full compensation has been supplied for a 
taking.13 The pending resolution of this issue will have a sig-
nificant effect on the design of environmental protection 
strategies within land use regulations and the ability of TDR 
programs to withstand legal challenges. 
Section II of this note sets forth the facts and procedural 
history of Suitum. The background of ripeness in the context of 
government regulation of land use and constitutional takings 
claims is examined in Section III. The major area of inquiry is 
the evolution and application of the Williamson County two 
hurdle, "final decision" and "state procedures," ripeness test.14 
The analysis of both the Ninth Circuit opinion and the revers-
ing United States Supreme Court opinion are presented in Sec-
tion IV. Section V evaluates the differing positions of the 
Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court regarding the application 
of the ripeness test to TDRs. The district court's likely ap-
proaches to applying the state procedures test in Suitum on 
remand are then discussed, with the conclusion that Suitum 
will meet the state procedures test for ripeness. Suitum will 
undoubtedly make its way back to the Ninth Circuit and possi-
9. See id. 
10. See id. at 1665 n.8. 
11. See Suitum II, 80 F.3d at 1665 n.8. 
12. See id. 
13. See id. at 1671-72 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
14. Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 
186,194 (1985). 
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bly the Supreme Court on the takings issue, and this section 
also examines the issue of whether TDRs are a property use or 
merely a compensation for a taking, as raised in Justice 
Scalia's concurrence.I5 Section VI concludes that there is am-
ple precedent and evidence in Suitum to hold that that the 
TDRs are a property right. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 1972, the plaintiff, Bernadine Suitum, purchased a sin-
gle-family residential lot in Incline Village, Nevada.I6 In 1989, 
Suitum received a residential allocation from Washoe County 
for construction of a house.I7 Suitum submitted building plans 
to TRPA for approval of a single family residence.I8 TRPA staff 
conducted a field verification of Suitum's property and deter-
mined that it was located entirely within a Stream Environ-
ment Zone ("SEZ"), according to the criteria of the 1987 Plan.I9 
15. Suitum N, 117 S. Ct. at 1671-72 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
16. See Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning 
Agency, No. 91-040 (D. Nev. Apr. 1, 1996) ("Suitum r). The lot was purchased in the 
Mill Creek Subdivision located in Incline Village. See id. The complaint stated that 
due to a variety of circumstances, including the illness and subsequent death of her 
husband, Bernadine Suitum was not in a position to undertake construction of a home 
until recently. See id. The subdivision in which the lot is located was substantially 
built out, and Suitum's lot was surrounded on three sides by existing residences and on 
the fourth side by an improved street with utilities. See id. 
17. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 80 F.3d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1996) 
("Suitum Ir). Under TRPA's 1987 Plan, a residential allocation is required prior to 
construction of additional residential units within the Lake Tahoe Basin. See Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agency Code of Ordinances, Chapter 33, Allocation of Development. 
The allocations are assigned to the counties within TRPA's jurisdiction. See id. The 
counties then assign the residential allocations to property owners. See id. Ten per-
cent of the residential allocations in Washoe County are reserved for parcels with Indi-
vidual Parcel Evaluation System (lPES) scores below the current qualification level, 
which would include Suitum's parcel. See id. Six allocations were reserved for such 
properties in Washoe County. See Defendant's Memorandum Concerning its Transfer 
of Development Program, Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'! Planning Agency, No. 91-040 (D. Nev. 
Apr. 1, 1996). The allocations for parcels with low IPES scores were assigned, upon 
application, to the property owners by random drawing. See id 
18. See Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, Suitum I (No. 91-040). 
19. See Regional Plan for the Lake Tahoe Basin, Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 
September 17, 1986. Stream Environment Zones (SEZ) are areas with surface water, 
riparian vegetation or alluvial soils. TRPA Code of Ordinances, Chapter 37. Protection 
of these areas was considered essential to preserve the water quality of Lake Tahoe. 
See id. 
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As a result, the lot was assigned an Individual Parcel Evalua-
tion System ("IPES") score of zero, precluding development of a 
house on the property.20 Suitum appealed the field verification 
classifying the property as a SEZ with an IPES score of zero.21 
TRPA denied the appeal and upheld the SEZ designation and 
the resulting IPES score.22 Suitum did not apply to TPRA to 
transfer her residential developments right and available land 
coverage to another property under the TDR program.23 
Following the TRPA Board's rejection of her appeal, Suitum 
filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of 
Nevada.24 The complaint alleged an unconstitutional taking 
and violations of substantive due process and equal protection 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, resulting from 
TRPA's improper exercise of police power when it refused Sui-
tum a permit to build a home on a residential lot.25 Suitum 
requested that TRPA's action be declared invalid and that 
TRPA be ordered to allow construction of a single family resi-
dence on her lot.26 Suitum also requested just compensation 
20. See Suitum II, 80 F.3d at 361. The IPES was incorporated into the 1987 Re-
gion Plan for the Lake Tahoe Basin. Regional Plan for the Lake Tahoe Basin, Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agency, pp. VII. 3-4, September 17, 1986. The IPES system is the 
basis for scoring the environmental sensitivity and developability of a parcel, asseBBing 
erosion hazard, runoff potential, accessibility, water influence areas, condition of the 
watershed, ability to revegetate, and the need for water quality improvements in the 
vicinity of the parcel. See id. A property with an IPES score of zero does not qualify for 
residential development under the 1987 Plan. Defendant's Memorandum Concerning 
its Transfer of Development, Suitum I (No. 91-040). The 1987 Plan, however, sets up 
an elaborate system of TDRs that allows for the sale and transfer of residential devel-
opment rights, residential allocations and land coverage to a receiving parcel. See ill. 
TRP A then allows the receiving parcel to construct a larger residential project than 
normally allowed under the plan. See id. Suitum's property was assigned one residen-
tial development right and 183 square feet of land coverage, which were available for 
Suitum to transfer or sell. See id. 
21. See Suitum II, 80 F.3d at 361. 
22. See id. 
23. See id. 
24. See Suitum I, No. 91·040 (order). 
25. See Suitum II, 80 F.3d at 360; Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, Suitum I, 
No. CV-N-91-040-ECR. The takings clause of the Fifth Amendment states "nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. 
amend. V. 
26. See Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, Suitum I, No. 91-040. 
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for the taking of her property and damages for the violations of 
her civil rights.27 
TRPA moved for summary judgment on all claims, and the 
district court concluded that ripeness was the threshold issue.28 
The specific inquiry was whether Suitum must obtain approval 
to sell or transfer her TDRs in order to achieve finality and 
present a ripe claim to the court.29 . The district court stated 
that the TDRs were a significant part of the calculus in deter-
mining the type and intensity of the property's allowed use.30 
The court found that finality, in terms of the property's allowed 
use, could only be determined after Suitum applied to transfer 
her development rights to another property.31 In its analysis, 
the district court examined previous cases, including a Ninth 
Circuit decision that indicated pursuit of transfer rights is 
among the list of items to be completed before a takings claim 
is ripe.32 Accordingly, the district court held that Suitum's 
claim was not ripe for adjudication and granted summary 
judgment to TRPA.33 
Suitum then appealed the district court's ruling to the 
Ninth Circuit.34 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district 
court that Suitum was required to apply for the property's 
TDRs in order to achieve finality and present the court with a 
ripe claim.35 In addition, the court found that Suitum failed to 
demonstrate that a TDR application would be futile and, thus, 
the futility exception to the ripeness doctrine did not apply.36 
27. See id. 
28. See Suitum I, No. 91-040. 
29. See id. 
30. See id. 
31. See id. 
32. See id. The court looked to Tahoe Preservation v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 
638 F. Supp. 126, 132-33 & n.6 (D. Nev. 1986) vacated on other grounds, 911 F. 2d 
1331, 1344 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990) (Fletcher, J., concurring), and Carpenter v. Tahoe Reg'l 
Planning Agency, 804 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Nev. 1992). 
33. See Suitum I, No. 91-040. 
34. See Suitum II, 80 F.3d at 359. 
35. See id. at 364. 
36. See id. 
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As a result, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's deci-
sion.s7 
Subsequently, Suitum filed a petition for a writ of certiorari 
to the United States Supreme Court.38 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and held that Suitum's regulatory-takings 
claim was ripe for adjudication because TRPA's decision deny-
ing the development application was a final decision and no 
further discretionary decisions remained regarding develop-
ment or transfer of the property's TDRs.s9 The Supreme Court 
vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision and remanded the case for 
further proceedings consistent with its opinion.4o The Ninth 
Circuit, in turn, remanded the case to the district court.41 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. THE EVOLUTION OF RIPENESS STANDARDS IN TAKINGS 
CLAIMS 
As there is no case or controversy unless a claim is ripe, a 
takings claim's ripeness governs the power of a federal court to 
act.42 The ripeness doctrine functions to avoid premature ad-
judication of disagreements with administrative policies.43 
Ripeness refers to "conditions that must exist or standards that 
must be met before a dispute is sufficiently mature to enable a 
37. See id. 
38. See Suitum v. Tahoe Regl Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1996) (·Suitum 
IIr>. 
39. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'} Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (1997) 
(·Suitum lV"). TRPA and Suitum agreed on the property's TDRs. See id. They also 
agreed that no more discretionary decisions needed to be made before the TDRs could 
be obtained and offered for sale. See id. The only agency decision remaining regarding 
any transfer was whether the prospective buyer could lawfully use the TDRs. See id. 
Despite the fact that a particular sale is subject to approval, ultimate salability was 
presumed because there are many potential lawful buyers and receipt of the TDRs 
would eventually be approved. See id. at 1668. 
40. See id at 1670. 
41. See Suitum v. Tahoe Regl Planning Agency, 123 F.3d 1322 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(·Suitum V"). 
42. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §2.4.1, 114 (2d ed. 1994). 
43. See Suitum v. Tahoe Regl Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (1997) 
(citing Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967». 
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court to decide a case on its merits."'" The doctrine is also in-
tended to protect public agencies from judicial interference un-
til an administrative decision has been formalized and its ef-
fects are felt by the challenging parties in a concrete way.45 If a 
court determines that a plaintiff has not met specific conditions 
with respect to ripeness, then the court must decline review of 
the case.46 
1. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York: The 
Foundation for Ripeness and Regulatory Takings. 
In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,47 the Supreme Court 
identified two primary ripeness considerations: (1) the fitness 
of the issues for judicial decision, and (2) the hardship to the 
parties of withholding court consideration.48 The Supreme 
Court's first significant application of ripeness principles to a 
land use regulatory case occurred in Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co. v. City of New York.49 In Penn Central, the owners of 
Grand Central Statio~ appealed a decision of New York City's 
Landmarks Preservation Commission, which denied permis-
sion to construct an office building in excess of 50 stories over 
Grand Central Station.50 The owners claimed that the applica-
tion of New York City's Landmark Preservation Law to land 
occupied by Grand Central Station constituted a taking in vio-
lation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.51 The Su-
preme Court rejected the takings claim, noting that other pos-
sible beneficial uses of the site existed that would be acceptable 
44. Patrick W. Maraist, A Statutory Beacon in the Land Use Ripeness Maze: The 
Florida Private Property Rights Protection Act, 47 FLA. L. REV. 411, 416 (1995) (detail-
ing both federal and State of Florida ripeness history and standards). 
45. See Suitum N, 117 S. Ct. at 1669 (citing Abbott Lab., 387 U.S. at 14849). 
46. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, at 115. 
47. 387 U.S. 136 (1967). 
48. See id. at 14849. The Federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) rule re-
quiring inclusion of generic names for prescription drugs on all labels and advertising 
was considered ripe for preenforcement judicial review due to the substantial hardship 
upon the plaintiffs of denying preenforcement review. See id. at 153-54. 
49. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
50. See id. at 116-19. 
51. See id. at 119. 
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to the Landmarks Preservation Commission.52 In addition, the 
owners had not applied for approval of a smaller structure or 
attempted to transfer their TDRs to other parcels in the vicin-
ity.53 The decision provided the foundation for subsequent re-
quirements that an applicant, whose development proposal was 
denied, modify or resubmit the application before a case is 
ripe.54 
2. Agins v. City of Tiburon: Final Regulatory Decision 
Required for Ripeness 
The next landmark land use regulation case in which the 
Supreme Court applied the ripeness doctrine was Agins v. City 
of Tiburon.55 In Agins, the City of Tiburon rezoned Agins' 
property for residential planned development and open space 
under a newly-adopted ordinance.56 Agins never sought ap-
proval for development of the property under the new zoning 
ordinance, but filed suit for inverse condemnation damages and 
requested that the ordinance be declared unconstitutional as a 
taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.57 
The Court framed the question as whether the mere enact-
ment of the zoning ordinances constituted a taking.58 The 
Court ruled that the zoning ordinances, on their face, did not 
take Agins' property without just compensation because the 
ordinances substantially advanced legitimate government 
52. See id. at 137. At oral argument, Penn Central's counsel admitted that the 
Commission had not suggested that it would not approve a smaller structure, such as a 
20 story office tower that was part of the terminal's original plan. See id. at 137 n.34. 
53. See id. at 136-37. The Court found that there were at least eight parcels in the 
vicinity of the terminal to which the owner could transfer his development rights. See 
id. at 137. One or two of the parcels were found suitable for new office buildings. See 
id. The court stated that the TDRs may not have been just compensation if a taking 
had occurred, but they would have mitigated any financial burdens the Landmark 
Preservation Law had imposed on the property owners. See id. Therefore, the TDRs 
were to be taken into account when considering the impact of regulation. See id. 
54. Maraist, supra note 44, at 422. 
55. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
56. See id. at 257. 
57. See id. at 257-58. 
58. See id. at 260. 
9
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goals.59 In addition, the adoption of the zoning ordinances did 
not inflict irreparable harm or a taking on the landowner be-
cause Agins could still pursue his reasonable investment-
backed expectations by submitting a development plan to the 
City.6o 
The key ripeness issue common to Penn Central and Agins 
is that a final regulatory decision applying an ordinance or law 
to the property at issue had not yet occurred because neither 
claimant had exhausted the regulatory opportunities available 
to obtain development approval for their properties.61 In Hodel 
v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Assn.,62 the Su-
preme Court went one step further and held that a regulatory 
takings claim is not ripe until the applicant has exhausted 
any administrative remedies contained in the disputed regula-
tions.63 
3. Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. 
Hamilton Bank: The Two-Hurdle Ripeness Test for Regulatory 
Takings 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court combined the final regu-
latory decision requirement and the administrative relief re-
quirement in Williamson County Regional Planning Commis-
sion v. Hamilton Bank.64 In Williamson County, the Court ap-
plied the two-hurdle test for ripeness to the application of land 
use regulations on a development proposal.65 The Court stated 
that the landowner must first demonstrate that a "final deci-
sion regarding the application of the [challenged] regulations to 
the property at issue" had been reached by the government 
agency "charged with implementing the regulations[.]m6 The 
landowner must then demonstrate that he has sought "com-
59. See id. at 261. 
60. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 262. 
61. See id. at 262-63; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136. 
62. 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
63. See id. at 297. The Court referenced a variance or waiver from surface mining 
regulations and restrictions as forms of administrative relief. See id. 
64. 473 U.S. 172, 190, 194 (1985). 
65. See id. at 186, 194. 
66. [d. at 186. 
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pensation through the procedures the State. has provided for 
doing SO."s7 
The Williamson County Regional Planning Commission 
("Commission") denied applications to complete the develop-
ment of a residential subdivision that had been partially con-
structed when the County amended its zoning ordinance.68 The 
Commission modified the method of calculating allowed densi-
ties, resulting in a substantial decrease in housing units for the 
project.69 The Commission later denied the project proposals 
for numerous reasons, including reasons related to the zoning 
ordinance changes.7o The landowner then filed a claim alleging 
that the Commission had taken its property without just. com-
pensation under the Fifth Amendment and should be estopped 
from denying approval of the project.71 
The Supreme Court determined that the landowner had yet 
to obtain a fmal decision regarding the application of the zon-
ing ordinance and subdivision regulations to its property and, 
therefore, failed the first, final-decision, hurdle of the ripeness 
test.72 While the landowner submitted development plans that 
arguably met the previous Penn Central and Agins require-
ments, the Court found that the landowner did not seek the 
variances required to develop the property according to the 
proposed plan.73 The Court distinguished the requirement to 
seek variances from the requirement to exhaust administrative 
remedies prior to bringing an action.74 Exhaustion of adminis-
67. ld. at 194. 
68. See id. at 180-82. 
69. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 178-79. 
70. See id. at 181. The denial was based, in part, on density problems, road 
grades, lack of tire protection, length of cul-de-sacs, disrepair of the main RCCeBB road, 
and minimum frontage. See id. 
71. See id. at 182. 
72. See id. at 186. 
73. See id. at 188-90. The landowner wrote a letter to the CommiBBion stating 
that it would not request variances from the Commission until after the Commission 
approved the proposed plat (project plan). See id. at 190. 
74. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 192-93. 
While the policies underlying the two concepts often overlap, the final-
ity requirement is concerned with whether the initial decision maker 
has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, 
concrete injury; the exhaustion requirement generally refers to admin-
11
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trative procedures is not required if the procedures are reme-
dial in nature, such as a declaratory judgment.75 
The landowner also failed the second, state-procedures, 
hurdle by not using the inverse condemnation procedures that 
State law provided to obtain just compensation in a taking 
situation.76 The Court noted that Tennessee statutes allow a 
property owner to bring an inverse condemnation action where 
a taking occurs due to restrictive zoning laws or development 
regulations.77 The Court found that the landowner had not 
shown that the inverse condemnation procedure, available to 
obtain compensation, was unavailable or inadequate?8 Until 
the landowner utilized that compensation procedure, the tak-
ings claim was premature under the test's second hurdle?9 
The ripeness tests set forth in Williamson County were fur-
ther refined in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County.80 
One of the allegations in the MacDonald complaint stated that 
any application for a zone change, variance or other relief 
would be futile.8! The Court was unable to determine whether 
there was a taking because no final decision on the project had 
occurred.82 Nonetheless, the Court addressed the concept of 
futility, noting that denial of a project does not necessarily 
mean that future applications would be futile, but that a 
meaningful application may not have been submitted.83 
istrative and judicial procedures by which an injured party may seek 
review of an adverse decision and obtain a remedy if the decision is 
found to be unlawful or otherwise inappropriate. 
Id at 193. 
75. See id. at 193. 
76. See id. at 196-97. 
77. See id. at 196. 
78. See id. at 196-97. 
79. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 196-97. 
80. 477 U.S. 340 (1986). 
81. See id. at 344. 
82. See id. at 351-53. 
83. See id. at 352-53 n.8. Refusal of a permit for intensive development does not 
preclude less intensive, but still valuable development. See id. 
12
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol28/iss1/7
1998] TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS 
B. RECENT APPLICATIONS OF THE WILLIAMSON COUNTY 
RIPENESS TEST 
99 
1. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: Ripeness 
Clarification Clouded by the Futility Exception 
The Court found that futility was a deciding factor in de-
termining the ripeness of the regulatory takings claim in Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council.84 Lucas bought two lots on 
a South Carolina barrier island, intending to build single fam-
ily homes.55 Subsequently, the State enacted the Beachfront 
Management Act, which barred residential development on 
these parcels due to public resource concerns.86 Lucas claimed 
that his property had been taken without just compensation.87 
The Beachfront Management Act was then amended, prior to 
the issuance of the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision, 
allowing the Coastal Council to issue "special permits" under 
certain circumstances.88 These special permits would allow 
construction of habitable structures seaward of the baseline.89 
After granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court 
rejected the Council's contention that Lucas' claim was not ripe 
for failure to apply for a special permit.90 The Court noted that 
such an application was not available at the time the case was 
argued in the South Carolina Supreme Court and that the 
taking, under the Act as read prior to the amendment, was un-
conditional and permanent.91 As any application would have 
84. 505 u.s. 1003 (1992). 
85. See ill. at 1006-07. 
86. See ill. at 1007. Lucas bought the properties in 1986. See id. at 1006. The 
Beachfront Management Act, enacted in 1988, established a "baseline connecting the 
landward-most points of erosion during the past forty years!,]" such that "construction 
of occupiable improvements was flatly prohibited seaward of a line drawn 20 feet 
landward of and parallel to the baseline!,)" with no exceptions. See ill at 1008-09. 
87. See ill. at 1009. 
88. See ill. at 1010-11. 
89. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1011. 
90. See ill. at 1010-13. 
91. See ill. at 1012. 
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been pointless and futile under the 1988 Act, the claim had at-
tained finality and was ripe for review.92 
2. Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency: A Pure 
Regulatory Takings Ripeness Case for the Supreme Court 
Despite the tests and precedents provided by the above-
mentioned cases, lower courts, landowners and regulatory 
agencies have had difficulty applying the ripeness rule to 
regulatory takings cases.93 The Suitum case, where ripeness 
was the sole issue presented, provided the Supreme Court with 
an opportunity to clarify the application of the ripeness doc-
trine in regulatory takings cases.94 
IV. COURTS' ANALYSIS 
The threshold issue in Suitum was whether the plaintiffs 
takings claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
was ripe for adjudication.95 The Ninth Circuit based its deci-
sion that the claim was· not ripe mainly on its conclusion that 
the TDRs allocated to the property might constitute a valuable 
use that abated the alleged taking.96 Suitum, therefore, needed 
a final government decision, to secure and transfer the TDRs to 
determine the extent of deveiopment allowed the property.97 
The United States Supreme Court approached the TDRs differ-
ently and concluded that a final decision had been reached and 
no further actions were needed to determine the TDRs' value.98 
The concurrence focused on whether TDRs should be consid-
ered in a takings ripeness decision and whether they are a 
92. See id. at 1012. The Coastal Council had stipulated that a building permit 
would not have issued under the 1988 Act, application or no application. See id at 1012 
n.3. 
93. Maraist, supra note 44, at 421. 
94. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1664. 
95. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 80 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1996) 
("Suitum Ir>. 
96. See id. at 362. 
97. See id. at 362-63. 
98. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 1667-68 (1997) 
("Suitum IV"). 
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property use or merely compensation for a taking.99 Each of 
these opinions will likely affect the ultimate outcome of the 
Suitum case when it is reheard at the district court level. 
A. THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
Under the court's interpretation of Williamson County, a 
regulatory takings claim is ripe when the "final decision" and 
"state procedures" prudential hurdles have been met prior to 
filing the case.lOO In Suitum, the Ninth Circuit noted that only 
the first hurdle, the final-decision requirement, was at issue on 
appeal.lOl 
The court found that no final decision had been reached as 
to how Suitum would be allowed to use her property because 
she had not applied to transfer her TDRs.lo2 A TDR transfer 
application was necessary to determine the extent of use of 
Suitum's property. loa A regulatory taking in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment occurs only if the regulation denies an owner 
all economically viable use of the land.104 
99. See id. at 1670-72 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
100. See Suitum 11, 80 F.3d at 362 (citing Williamson County Regl Planning 
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985». The plaintiff must demonstrate 
that (1) the government entity charged with implementing the regulations alleged to 
have resulted in a taking has reached a final decision on the regulation's application to 
the property at issue and (2) the plaintiff has pursued any "reasonable, certain and 
adequate" provisions that the agency has established for obtaining compensation at the 
time of the taking. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 186,194. 
101. See Suitum 11, 80 F.3d at 362. The district court's decision focused only on the 
finality test and did not address the compensation test. Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Plan-
ning Agency, 91-040 (D. Nev. Apr. 1, 1996) ("Suitum n. The district court found that a 
TDR transfer application was the only meaningful application that could be made once 
the property was determined to be within the SEZ designation. See id. As Suitum had 
not filed the application, there was no finality. See id. 
102. See Suitum 11,80 F.3d at 362. 
103. See id. 
104. See id. at 361 (citing Carson Harbor Village Ltd. v. City of Carson 37 F.3d 468, 
473 (9th Cir. 1994». The Suitum court noted that the definition of "economically viable 
use" had yet to be determined with much precision. See id. at 361-62. Relevant factors 
are the regulation's economic impact and the extent to which it interferes with invest-
ment backed expectations. See id. at 362 (citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of 
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978». 
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The Ninth Circuit reasoned that without an application for 
transfer of the TDRs, TRPA was foreclosed from determining 
the nature and extent of the use and development permitted for 
Suitum's property.105 The court viewed the TDRs as "uses" of 
Suitum's property under TRPA's regulations.lOG As such, the 
TDRs were an alternative use of a SEZ property that was not 
materially different from other alternative uses a property 
owner may seek when denied approval for a proposed develop-
ment.107 Without an application for sale or transfer of the 
TDRs, the court could not determine the extent of the property 
rights that Suitum possessed and, therefore, could not know 
the full economic impact of the regulations on Suitum's prop-
erty.lOB 
Suitum claimed that an application to sell or transfer her 
TDRs would be futile because the TDR program was a "sham" 
that had produced no sales and, thus, no market value for her 
TDRs.l09 The Ninth Circuit recognized the limited futility ex-
ception to the ripeness doctrine set forth in Del Monte Dunes at 
Monterey Ltd. v. City of Monterey. 110 The court held the futility 
exception to be inapplicable, however, because Suitum's TDRs 
had some significant value.l11 Therefore, participation in the 
TDR program was not a futile endeavor to achieve an economic 
use of the property.112 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that Suitum's claims were not 
ripe because of a failure to apply for TDRs pursuant to TRPA's 
program and a failure to demonstrate that such an application 
105. See Suitum II, 80 F.3d at 362. 
106. See id. at 363. 
107. See id. In taking this approach, the court was distinguishing TDRs as a use of 
the property or property right as opposed to compensation for regulatory restrictions on 
the use of the property. See id. 
108. See id. at 362-63. 
109. See id. at 363. 
110. 920 F.2d 1496, 1501 (9th Cir. 1990). 
111. See Suitum 11, 80 F.3d at 363-64. The court held that evidence supported a 
market value of $10,000 to $21,500 for the development rights with an additional value 
of $30,000 if accompanied by a development allocation right. See id. at 363. 
112. See id. at 364. 
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would be futile.u3 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
district court's grant of summary judgment to TRPA.u4 
B. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
In response to the Ninth Circuit's affirmance of the district 
court's holding, Suitum filed a petition for writ of certiorari to 
the United States Supreme Court, which the Court granted.1l5 
Like the courts below, the Supreme Court applied the William-
son County finality rule to the ripeness issue. us The majority 
and concurring opinions differed in their assessment of 
TDRs.ll7 
1. The Majority Opinion 
The majority found that the facts in Suitum were distin-
guishable from prior landmark ripeness cases.us The Court 
noted that the prior landmark cases were not ripe because fur-
ther regulatory steps existed that the plaintiffs could have 
taken to reach a final decision regarding the properties' al-
lowed uses.U9 
The Suitum Court found no further regulatory steps existed 
because no questions remained regarding how TRPA's devel-
opment and TDR regulations applied to the property.120 The 
113. See id. 
114. See id. 
115. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659 (1997) ("Suitum 
lV"). 
116. See id. at 1664-65. 
117. See id. at 1662. (Souter, J. delivered the opinion of the court in which 
Rehnquist, C.J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., joined, and in which 
O'Conner, Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined in part and concurred in part.) 
118. See id. 1665-67; 
119. See id. In Agins v City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), the property owner 
challenged the enactment of a zoning statute without having submitted a development 
plan for the property. See Agins, 447 U.S.257. Ripeness was lacking because there 
was no concrete controversy regarding the application of the specific zoning provisions. 
See id. at 260. In Hrxkl v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n. Inc. 452 U.S. 
264 (1981) and Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of John-
son City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), takings challenges were unripe because the plaintiff had 
not yet applied for the variances potentially allowed by the regulations. 
120. See Suitum N, 117 S. Ct. at 1667. 
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Court noted that: 1) the parties had agreed on the particular 
TDRs to which Suitum was entitled; and 2) no discretionary 
decision was required of any agency official before Suitum 
could obtain the TDRs or offer them for sale.l21 Although 
agency approval was needed to allow a given buyer to lawfully 
use the TDRs, the Court concluded that enough potential buy-
ers capable of meeting TRPA's approval existed and, thus, the 
TDRs were salable.l22 As a result, the final decision require-
ment of the ripeness test was met.123 
The Supreme Court did not assess the second ripeness re-
quirement, that the landowner seek compensation through the 
procedures provided by the State prior to filing a regulatory 
taking claim, because it found that the "state procedures" com-
pensation test was inapplicable.l24 The Court noted that ordi-
narily a plaintiff must seek compensation if the state provides 
adequate procedures or remedies for inverse condemnation.l25 
In this case, however, TRPA maintained that it did not have 
provisions for paying just compensation, thus, implying that 
there were no applicable "state procedures. "126 
The Court then addressed TRPA's argument that the case 
was not ripe because the value of Suitum's TDRs could not be 
determined without an actual, prospective sale, subject to 
TRPA's approval.127 While Suitum had not yet offered the 
TDRs for sale, the Court determined that a sale was not neces-
sary to determine their value.l28 The Court found that the 
class of TDR buyers qualified to receive TRPA approval was 
broad enough to conclude that the TDRs were salable.l29 Addi-
121. See id. 
122. See id. at 1667-68. 
123. See id. at 166B. 
124. See id. at 1665 n.B. 
125. See Suitum N, 117 S. Ct. at 1665 n.B. 
126. See id. Suitum's counsel stated TRPA's position at oral argument and TRPA's 
counsel did not object to the implication that the agency was not subject to inverse 
condemnation proceedings. See id. 
127. See id. at 1668. 
12B. See id. 
129. See id. TRPA and Suitum agreed on the particular TDRs entitled to the prop-
erty and that no discretionary decisions remained to be made by any agency official in 
order to obtain the TDRs or to offer them for sale. See id at 1667. The only remaining 
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tionally, the Court found that the TDRs' market value could be 
determined by opinion evidence without the benefit of a pend-
ing sale.130 Therefore, the TDRs' valuation was simply an issue 
of market prices, on which considerable evidence had already 
been presented to the district court.l3l The Court concluded 
that the ripeness doctrine did not require Suitum to obtain a 
prospective buyer for her TDRs or apply for TRPA's approval to 
determine the level of compensation appropriate for the tak-
ings c1aim.132 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that Suitum's regula-
tory takings claim was ripe for adjudication because a final de-
cision denying the development application had occurred and 
no further discretionary decisions remained regarding transfer 
and valuation of the property's TDRs.l33 The Court vacated the 
Ninth Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for further 
proceedings.l34 The Ninth Circuit then remanded the case to 
the district court with directions to consider the second prong 
of the Williamson County test; state procedures for seeking 
compensation.l35 
2. The Concurrence 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices O'Connor and Thomas, 
argued that the majority incorrectly applied the final decision 
requirement of the ripeness doctrine in Suitum. 136 The concur-
rence declared that the final decision was TRPA's denial of Sui-
tum's development request, for this denial determined the 
agency decision was whether a prospective buyer could lawfully use the TDRs. See id. 
Even if a particular sale was subject to approval, ultimate salability was presumed 
since there were many lawful potential buyers ensuring that ultimately transfer and 
receipt of the TDRs would be approved. See id at 1668. 
130. See Suitum N, 117 S. Ct. at 1669. 
131. See id. at 1668. 
132. See id. 
133. See id. at 1667, 1670. The final· decision was TRPA's denial of development 
and subsequent denial of the appeal of the property's SEZ classification and IPES 
score. See id. at 1663, 1670. 
134. See id. at 1670. 
135. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'} Planning Agency, 123 F.3d 1322 (9th Cir. 1997) 
("Suitum V"). 
136. See Suitum N, 117 S. Ct. at 1670. 
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permissible use of Suitum's land.137 The decision on the TDRs 
was not relevant in the final decision analysis because TDRs 
were not a "use" of the land.l38 While the majority did not de-
cide whether TDRs should be considered a use of the property 
in evaluating a takings claim, the concurrence maintained that 
TDRs are a new right conferred upon a landowner for compen-
sation in exchange for a taking and not a residual right or 
use. 139 
The concurrence viewed TDRs only as a compensation vehi-
cle to be used in assessing whether the landowner had been 
adequately compensated for the taking.140 The opinion further 
suggested that TDRs are not "undesirable or devious[,]" but 
serve the purpose of mitigating the economic loss of a re-
stricted-use property.l4l As such, TDRs are not appropriate in 
offsetting restrictions that would otherwise be sufficient to pro-
duce a compensable taking and should not be taken into ac-
count when assessing whether a taking has occurred.l42 
v. CRITIQUE 
A. SUITUM: RIPE FOR TAKINGS UNDER FINAL DECISION AND 
STATE PROCEDURES HURDLES 
The United States Supreme Court held that Suitum was 
ripe for adjudication, but did not decide whether a taking had 
occurred.l43 The Court correctly found that Suitum met the 
"final decision" requirement for ripeness because no discretion-
ary decisions remained in allocating the TDRs to Suitum's 
137. See id. at 1673. 
138. See id. at 1671. 
139. See id. at 1662, 1671. The concurrence stated that the Penn Central precedent 
of recognizing TDRs as a potential property right in considering the impact of a regula-
tion should be distinguished from Suitum because the property owners in Penn Central 
owned additional surrounding properties that could directly benefit from the TDRs. 
See id at 1672. 
140. See id. at 1670-71. 
141. See Suitum N, 117 S. Ct. at 1672 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
142. See id. at 1672. 
143. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 1670 (1997) 
(MSuitum lV"). 
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property.l44 While it might appear that considerable TRP A 
involvement was necessary to validate any sale or transfer of 
the TDRs, ultimately, an acceptable buyer for Suitum's TDRs 
would be found. l45 With ample evidence that the value of the 
TDRs could be appraised, it logically follows that the value of 
the TDRs becomes an issue of their market price, and not an 
issue dependent upon further administrative decisions by 
TRP A. 146 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the case was 
ripe based upon the "final decision" test and remanded it to the 
Ninth Circuit for further proceedings.147 
1. Clarification on Williamson County State Procedures 
Ripeness Hurdle Avoided in Suitum 
The Supreme Court decision ostensibly reverses prior Ninth 
Circuit decisions requiring finalization of TDRs prior to ripe-
ness.l48 The actual effect of the decision, however, is uncertain 
because the majority opinion narrowly applied only the first 
step, "final decision" hurdle, of the Williamson County ripeness 
test.149 Application of the second step "state procedures" com-
pensation requirement was not before the Court, leaving it 
open for interpretation.150 
In contrast, the concurrence strongly argued that TDRs are 
not relevant to the "final decision" requirement because they 
144. See id. at 1667. 
145. See id. at 1668. 
146. See id. 
147. See id. at 1670. 
148. See Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 911 
F.2d 1331, 1344 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990) (Fletcher J. concurring); Carpenter v. Tahoe Reg'! 
Planning Agency, 804 F. Supp. 1316, 1324-25 (D. Nev. 1992): Tahoe-Sierra Preserva-
tion Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 638 F. Supp. 126, 132-33 & n.6 (D. Nev. 
1986), vacated on other grounds, 911 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1990). 
149. See Suitum N, 117 S. Ct. at 1665. This was the only step of the test the Ninth 
Circuit addressed. See Suitum II, 80 F.3d 359. 
150. See Suitum N, 117 S. Ct. at 1665. Previous regulatory ripeness cases decided 
by the Court under the Williamson County ripeness test were either found to be unripe 
due to lack of finality, see e.g. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 
340, 351 (1986); Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 
U.S. 172, 194 (1985), or ripe due to finality, but with no applicable state compensation 
procedure to examine, see e.g. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 
1012, 1014 n.3 (1992). 
21
Hitchcock: Transferable Development Rights
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1998
108 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:87 
are not a use of the land, but are a compensation system for a 
regulatory taking.151 The majority did not expressly reject the 
concurrence's position.152 The result is a majority opinion that 
provides no clear direction to the Ninth Circuit regarding ap-
plication of TDRs to the ripeness, takings, and compensation 
issues; and a concurrence that is clearly contrary to the Ninth 
Circuit's current assessment of TDRs in land use regulation 
takings cases.l53 The Ninth Circuit will now need to determine 
(1) whether TDRs have a relevant application within the Wil-
liamson County "state procedures" ripeness hurdle and (2) how 
to apply the takings and adequate compensation tests to Sui-
tum's TDRs.I54 
2. Application of State Procedures Requirement to Sui tum 
The actions available to the district court in applying the 
"state procedures" requirement in Suitum appear straightfor-
ward. Under the state procedures requirement, a property 
owner claiming a regulatory taking must seek compensation 
through procedures set up by the state for that purpose.155 A 
reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining com-
pensation must have existed at the time of the taking.156 If the 
government has provided an adequate process for compensa-
tion, then the property owner does not have a takings claim 
until the process has been used and just compensation has 
been denied.157 The district court will likely determine, as 
TRPA has asserted, that TRPA has no compensation process 
available to Suitum and that Suitum's TDRs are a property 
right and not a compensation measure.l58 Accordingly, Sui-
151. See Suitum IV, 117 S. Ct. at 1671 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
152. See id. at 1670. 
153. See id. at 1668-71. Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 91-040 (D. Nev. 
Apr. I, 1996) ("Suitum r); Tahoe-Sierra, 911 F.2d 1331; Carpenter v. Tahoe Reg'l 
Planning Agency, S04 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Nev. 1992). 
154. See Suitum N, 117 S. Ct. at 1670; Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 
123 F.3d 1322 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Suitum V"). 
155. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194-95. 
156. See id. at 194. (citing Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 
124-25 (1974». 
157. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 195. 
15S. Suitum N, 117 S. Ct. at 1665 n.S. 
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tum's complaint will be ripe based upon the "final decision" 
holding of the Supreme Court.159 
If the district court reverses its previous position that TDRs 
are a property right or property use and finds that TDRs are 
part of some type of compensation program, then it will need to 
assess the extent to which Suitum has participated in the pro-
gram.l60 Following the Supreme Court's holding that the 
amount of Suitum's TDRs has already been determined, such 
that their value can be appraised, the claim is ripe because 
Suitum participated in the state procedures sufficiently to de-
termine the level of compensation due to her property.161 
B. TDRs: A PROPERTY RIGHT OR COMPENSATION FOR A 
TAKING? 
Finding that the "state procedures" test is either inapplica-
ble or has been met, the district court will need to determine 
whether a taking has occurred.162 A key issue will be whether 
the court finds that Suitum's TDRs are rights and beneficial 
uses of the property, and whether the TDRs, along with other 
limited residual uses of the property, constitute sufficient bene-
ficial use to preclude a taking.l63 The final outcome of this 
analysis will be of enormous significance to the future use of 
TDRs in the Lake Tahoe Basin and throughout the country. If 
TDRs are found to be merely a compensation measure for 
regulatory taking, governments will be required to augment 
159. See id. at 1667. 
160. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194-95. 
161. See Suitum N, 117 S. Ct. at 1668-69. The Supreme Court stated that the com-
pensation values attributed to the TDRs could be determined; therefore it was unnec-
essary for Suitum to finalize the TDR allocation and sales. See id. 
162. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194. 
163. See Affidavit of Susan E. Scholley in Support of Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, No 91-040 (D. Nev. Apr. 1, 1996). Spe-
cific allowed uses included vegetation, such as gardening and landscaping, and struc-
tures that allowed 75% or more of precipitation to reach the ground, such as chaise 
lounges and patio tables, jungle gyms, swing sets, pet enclosures, picnic tables, volley-
ball or badminton sets, and garden trellises. See id. 
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any shortfalls in the value of the TDRs to provide full compen-
sation for the taking.l64 
1. TDRs as a Property Right in the Development of a Regional 
Planning Area 
TDRs are a development right because they represent a 
fractional share of the cumulative development allowed for the 
entire region, as determined by TRPA's regional environmental 
thresholds and cumulative carrying capacity analysis.l65 When 
the TDRs are allocated to individual parcels, that allocation is 
conceptually the same as any other zoning or planning process 
that restricts development potential according to valid police-
power purposes and rationally assigns development densities 
and uses to individual properties, which may then become 
vested property rights upon development application 
approval. 166 
Thus, TDRs may be viewed as an extension of basic zoning 
principles, as in Barancik v. County of Marin,167 where the 
Ninth Circuit determined that TDRs constituted valid devel-
opment rights that could be purchased to increase the devel-
opment potential of a property beyond that normally allowed 
under the zoning ordinance.l68 California state courts within 
the Ninth Circuit have also positively identified TDRs as a type 
of property right, with the characteristics of real property.169 
164. See Richard J. Lazarus, Litigating Suitum u. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency 
in the United States Supreme Court, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL L. 179, 201 (Spring 
1997). The essay, written after oral arguments and before the opinion, discusses the 
relevance of the case to property rights issues generally and TDRs specifically. See id. 
at 181. 
165. See Regional Plan for the Lake Tahoe Basin, Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 
September 17, 1986. 
166. See Communication from Roy Gorman, Associate Professor of Law, Golden 
Gate University Law School (January 11, 1998), on tile with author. 
167. 872 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1989). 
168. See id. at 837. The court found that the Marin County TDR program, allowing 
for accumulation of development rights through purchase from owners in the same 
area, was rationally related to preservation of agriculture and did not result in an 
increase in the total amount of development possible in the rural corridor. See id. 
169. See Mitsui Fudosan (U.S.A) Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 268 Cal. Rptr. 356, 
357 Cal, Ct, apphe one of the fractional interests in the complex bundle of rights aria-
24
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol28/iss1/7
1998] TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS 111 
Similarly, TRPA has maintained that its TDR program was 
based upon TDRs as part of the bundle of rights associated 
with properties within its jurisdiction and not an inverse con-
demnation compensation program.170 
2. TDRs as a Marketable Beneficial Use of a Property 
In addition, TDRs can provide economic value to Suitum's 
property through their market sales value within the Tahoe 
Basin; thus, it is reasonable that the district court view TDRs 
as an appurtenant property right conferring a beneficial use to 
Suitum's property.l7l This position is also consistent with the 
TDR precedents set forth by the Supreme Court in Penn Cen-
tral and with the public policy and environmental management 
priorities of the congressionally approved Tahoe Regional 
Planning Compact.172 
If the district court finds that TDRs are a property right and 
hence a beneficial use of the property, then TDRs, along with 
other residual uses of the land, must be assessed to determine 
if a taking has occurred.173 The standard for inverse condem-
nation is where a regulation denies all economically beneficial 
or productive use of the land.174 The TDRs do have economic 
ing from ownership of land and subject to real estate tax assessment upon transfer to a 
receiving property. See id at 528. 
170. See Suitum N, 117 S. Ct. at 1663, 1665, n.8. 
171. See id. at 1663; Mitsui Fudosan, 268 Cal. Rptr. At 358. TDRs allowing maxi-
mum floor area ratios to be exceeded were subject to hallmarks of real property trans-
fer with agreements that the TDRs be appurtenant to and used for the benefit of the 
real property owned by the buyer. See Mitsui Fudosan , 268 Cal. Rptr. at 528-29. 
172. See Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, Pub. L. 91-148, 83 Stat. 360; Penn 
Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
173. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 
393, 415 (1922». 
174. See id. at 1015. The Court noted that a determination of the Mdeprivation of all 
economically feasible use" rule is imprecise, such that a regulation requiring 90% of a 
rural tract to remain in its natural state may deprive the owner of all economically 
beneficial use of the burdened portion of the property, or be a mere diminution in the 
value of the tract as a whole. See id. at 1016 n.7. The Lucas Court went on to com-
ment that the decision in Penn Central was an extreme and insupportable view of 
economic use, implying that TDRs should not figure heavily in determining the ec0-
nomic use of a property. See id. The concurring opinion in Suitum presented a similar 
view of TDRs, and distinguished Penn Central from Suitum because the landowner in 
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value, providing an economically-beneficial use of the land; 
thus, the property has not lost all economic use and a taking 
has not occurred.175 
Suitum argued that TDRs are merely administrative crea-
tions that do not constitute a use of the land and are not a sub-
stitute for a right to build a home.176 This argument ignores 
the fact that properties are often regulated to restrict or change 
the purchaser's anticipated allowable uses, but a taking will 
not occur as long as some economic or beneficial use remains.177 
The TDRs, in essence, represent new economic, and thus bene-
ficial, uses of the property that replace more intensive uses de-
termined to be environmentally damaging to Lake Tahoe.178 
The position presented by the concurring opinion, that 
TDRs have nothing to do with the use of the land and are 
merely chits redeemable on the market for compensation, did 
not take into account the real-property nature of the TDRs.179 
TDRs often bear all the hallmarks of real property transfers; 
such as escrow accounts, escrow instructions, purchase and 
sale agreements, title reports and title insurance, and restric-
tive covenants.180 TDRs are much more than mere chits and 
can directly affect the development patterns and densities of 
receiving properties within the planning region. 
The substantial market value of the TDRs as property 
rights and their beneficial use to the holding and receiving 
Penn Central owned nearby property that could benefit from the TDRs. See Suitum N, 
117 S. Ct. at 1672 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
175. See Suitum N, 117 S. Ct. at 1663. The development rights, together with an 
allocation right and land coverage, were valued at approximately $35,600 to $44,700, 
and the land without development rights was valued at $7,125 to $16,750 for a total 
approximate value of $42,725 to $61,450. See id. at 1664. Suitum originally pur-
chased the property for $28,000 in 1972. Deposition of Bernadine Suitum, Suitum v. 
Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, NO. 91-040 (D. Nev. Apr. 1, 1996) ("Suitum n. 
176. See Petitioner's Brief at 19-20, Suitum N, 117 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 96-243). 
177. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-16; .Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-61; Penn Central, 438 
U.S. at 137-38 n.36. 
178. See Tahoe Regional Planning Agency Code of Ordinances, Chapter 34, Trans-
fer of Development. 
179. See Suitum N, 117 S. Ct. at 1671 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
180. See Mitsui Fudosan, 268 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 529. 
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properties provide ample support for the District Court to find 
that Suitum retains substantial economic use of her 
property. 181 Therefore, the court could reasonably determine 
that TRPA's regulations have not gone too far and no inverse 
condemnation or taking of Suitum's property had occurred.182 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Given the regulatory and TDR allocation application envi-
ronment under which this case was brought, the Supreme 
Court's decision in Sui tum clarifies that courts must look be-
yond the mere existence of another structured, regulatory step 
in testing the "final decision" requirement for ripeness.l83 
Courts must fully examine the extent to which that step has a 
truly discretionary component, which makes finality unpre-
dictable in terms of Williamson County.l84 In addition, the 
ruling implies that the second, state procedures, requirement 
of the test may be fulfilled without action by the property 
owner if the level of compensation allowed under state proce-
dures is nondiscretionary and can be determined through tes-
timony.l85 
The concurring opinion goes too far in labeling TDRs a de-
vice that only provides for property takings compensation and 
not a property right to be assessed when evaluating whether a 
taking has occurred.l86 The nature of TDRs vary from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction and may represent transfers of actual prop-
erty uses and densities through transactions similar to real 
property sales, making it evident that TDRs are a part of the 
bundle of property rights within thatjurisdiction.187 
181. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. 
182. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. 
183. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 1667·68 (1997) 
("Suitum lV"). 
184. See id. at 1668-69. 
185. See id. 
186. See id. at 1671. 
187. See Barancik v. Mann, 872 F.2d 834, 837 (9th Cir. 1989); Mitsui Fudosan v. 
Los Angeles, 268 Cal. Rptr. 356, 527-29 (1990); 
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The Ninth Circuit may have an opportunity to re-visit Sui-
tum if t~e district court's pending decision is appealed. The 
Ninth Circuit has adequate precedent and evidence on the rec-
ord to both accept TRPA's assertion that TDRs are legitimate 
property rights, and not merely compensation for a taking, and 
to hold that no taking has occurred because TRPA's regulations 
have not resulted in the loss of all economic use of Suitum's 
land. ISS Should the Ninth Circuit find that no taking has oc-
curred, it is likely that Suitum will return to the Supreme 
Court for further deliberation on TDRs as a takings versus 
compensation, followed possibly by deliberation on the amount 
of loss in economic use required for a regulatory taking. 
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